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Decomposing Political Knowledge: 
What Is Confidence in Knowledge and Why It Matters 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
While political knowledge has been conceptually defined with two constructs – accuracy 
and confidence in factual information – conventional measurement of political knowledge 
has relied heavily on retrieval accuracy. Without measuring confidence-in-knowledge, it is 
not possible to rigorously identify different types of political informedness, such as 
misinformedness and uninformedness. This article theoretically explores the two 
constructs of knowledge and argues that each construct has unique antecedents and 
behavioral consequences. We suggest a survey instrument for confidence-in-knowledge 
and introduce a method to estimate latent traits of retrieval accuracy and confidence 
separately. Using our original survey that includes the measure of confidence-in-
knowledge, we find that misinformed citizens are as engaged in politics as the well-
informed, but their active involvement does not guarantee informed political choices. Our 
findings warrant further theoretical and empirical exploration of confidence in political 
knowledge. 
Keywords: political knowledge; retrieval accuracy; confidence-in-knowledge; IRT model 
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“Think of the person who makes a true statement based on adequate reasons, 
but does not feel confident that it is true. 
Obviously, he is much less likely to act on it, and, 
in the extreme case of lack of confidence, would not act on it.” 
–Pears, “What is Knowledge?” (1971, p.15) 
1. Introduction 
Political knowledge is an important factor to understand citizens’ attitudes and behavior in 
the political domain. A certain level of political knowledge increases citizens’ ability to 
connect their interests with specific public issues and promotes political participation, 
whereas lack of such knowledge and a strong belief in false information misguide citizens’ 
policy preferences (Kuklinski et al. 2000). Moreover, a growing literature suggests that 
misinformation can be more detrimental than the mere lack of correct information since it 
misguides citizens’ policy preferences (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 2000) and cannot be easily 
corrected (Berinsky 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). This, in 
turn, will endanger the quality of democratic governance (Hochschild and Einstein 2015). 
It is also well acknowledged that the typical way of measuring political knowledge entails 
biases and limitations. Measuring political knowledge by scaling how accurate survey 
respondents’ answers for a series of questions about political systems, political figures, and 
current affairs cannot distinguish a response based on guessing from one based on strong 
belief in the retrieved information. Consequently, the conventional measurement that 
relies solely on retrieval accuracy inevitably results in misidentification problems, 
particularly in studies where the distinction between individuals who hold incorrect 
information based on strong belief (misinformedness) and those who give incorrect 
answers due to guessing (uninformedness) is critical. Previous research has proposed 
various methods to deal with this issue, but most of them are post-hoc survey tools applied 
at the analysis stage to detect guessing behavior or to reveal latent levels of political 
knowledge. Yet, there has not been much of advancement in survey design to cope with this 
measurement problem. 
In this study, we propose a method to decompose two aspects of political knowledge – 
accuracy in retrieving information stored in memory (hereafter, retrieval accuracy) and 
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confidence-in-knowledge. In doing so, we use a simple survey instrument to capture 
confidence-in-knowledge, an under-appreciated aspect of political knowledge, to solve the 
measurement issue in political knowledge. The survey instrument is useful in handling the 
biases due to guessing and allows us to fully address the two constructs that are used to 
conceptually define political knowledge and different types of political informedness. We 
also introduce a statistical method for latent scaling, an extension of Item Response Theory 
(IRT) models, that identifies the two constructs of political knowledge in two independent 
dimensions. Using this method we estimate individual respondents’ latent traits for the 
ability to accurately retrieve stored information (latent accuracy) and for the level of 
information accessibility and familiarity (latent confidence). 
We administer an online survey in the UK that includes the survey instrument to measure 
confidence-in-knowledge. Using the estimates from our method, we map individual survey 
respondents on the conceptually defined two-dimensional space of political knowledge. 
Our empirical analysis shows that the confidence-in-knowledge measure can help 
overcome limitations of the conventional survey measures of political knowledge (that 
primarily focus on retrieval accuracy). 
In this paper, we first demonstrate that respondents’ reported levels of confidence in their 
responses to factual questions (i.e., confidence-in-knowledge) could be a good proxy of the 
availability and accessibility of political information. Particularly, we demonstrate that the 
confidence-in-knowledge measure is necessary to define various types of “informedness” 
and to empirically distinguish the misinformed from the uninformed drawing on previous 
conceptual work. With the two decomposed constructs of political knowledge, we revisit 
existing theories about the causes and effects of political knowledge to identify which 
construct of political knowledge is more strongly associated with the relevant political 
variables. In this replication analysis, we find that misinformed citizens (highly confident 
but less accurate) are as active as well-informed citizens (highly confident and very 
accurate) in political engagement. Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding 
of political knowledge by demonstrating potential biases when using the traditional 
measure as the sole proxy of political knowledge and advantages of incorporating the 
confidence-in-knowledge construct in the measurement of political knowledge. 
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2. Concerns in Measuring Knowledge with Retrieval Accuracy 
Political knowledge is typically measured by counting the number of correct responses by a 
survey respondent to a series of questions about political facts. Despite its extensive use in 
various studies on citizens’ behavior and information processing, this measurement is far 
from being perfect. First, when recalling or retrieving stored memory, individuals may 
forget relevant information or reconstruct the information erroneously. Second, potential 
biases due the propensity of guessing are more concerning. Particularly when Don’t Know 
(DK) is provided as a response option, the propensity of guessing is systematically related 
to other variables. For example, male respondents are more likely than female respondents 
to make a random guess instead of answering DK when they are uncertain about the 
correct answer. The estimated level of political knowledge therefore tends to be 
systematically higher for male respondents than for female counterparts even if their 
actual knowledge levels are the same (Mondak and Anderson 2004). Several studies have 
estimated the prevalence of such biases and suggested a better survey design to reduce this 
bias (Miller and Orr 2008; Mondak and Anderson 2003, 2004; Mondak and Davis 2001; 
Sturgis, Allum, and Smith 2008). 
However, there is a more fundamental conceptual issue in the conventional measurement 
of political knowledge. Although the conventional measure assumes that the “accuracy” in 
the retrieval of stored information indicates the depth and extent of available information, 
political knowledge (and types of “informedness”) has been conceptually defined not only 
with the correctness of answers, but also with the strength of beliefs in knowledge. For 
instance, Kuklinski and colleagues state: 
“[T]o be informed requires, first, that people have factual beliefs and, second, that 
the beliefs be accurate. If people do not hold factual beliefs at all, they are merely 
uninformed. They are, with respect to the particular matter, in the dark. But if they 
firmly hold beliefs that happen to be wrong, they are misinformed–not just in the 
dark, but wrongheaded.” (Kuklinski et al. 2000, 792–3, emphases from original) 
 
Similarly, Mondak and Davis (2001) define different types of political knowledge, where 
the strength of belief in the correctness is the key to differentiate misinformedness from 
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uninformedness. Pasek et al. (2015) also emphasize that we should distinguish ignorance 
(lacking a correct belief) and misinformation (holding an incorrect belief with confidence). 
To summarize, these works suggest that there are at least four types of individuals in terms 
of political informedness, defined by both the level of accuracy and the level of confidence-
in-knowledge.  Figure 1 illustrates these four types of informedness on a two-dimensional 
space: misinformed, uninformed, partially informed, and fully informed.  
Figure 1. Conceptualization of Political Knowledge 
 
Note: The x-axis denotes the level of accuracy, which is often measured by classic factual knowledge 
items, and the y-axis denotes the level of confidence – how confident individuals are about their 
knowledge about political facts. 
 
Although the conventional measurement (i.e., retrieval accuracy) maps individuals’ level of 
knowledge onto a single dimension (e.g., uninformed vs. fully informed), the construct of 
“confidence in factual knowledge” extends the space to further distinguish those who are at 
the same level of retrieval accuracy into two groups based on the strength of their beliefs in 
the correctness of their responses (misinformed vs. partially informed for those with low 
retrieval accuracy and fully informed vs. partially informed for those with high retrieval 
accuracy). The confidence-in-knowledge dimension is particularly important to identify 
whether a response to a factual question is based on a genuine belief or on guessing and 
thus to examine whether the consequences of such misbelief can be substantially different 
from the same incorrect answer based on guessing. 
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Despite broad agreement among scholars on this conceptualization, it is surprising that 
only a few studies have taken the confidence-in-knowledge dimension seriously both in 
their theoretical and empirical definition of political knowledge.1 
3. Sources of Confidence-in-Knowledge: Information Accessibility and 
Familiarity 
A general definition of knowledge is “information stored in memory.” The literature 
suggests that there are at least two ways for individuals to express the stored information: 
recalling the information directly (aka objective knowledge) and indicating how sure they 
are that specific piece of information is available in memory (aka subjective knowledge, 
feeling of knowing, perceived knowledge or confidence in knowledge, which we use here) 
(e.g., Schacter 1983). Psychologists found that the two aspects of knowledge are distinct 
constructs; each has a unique measure and antecedents (Park, Mothersbaugh, and Feick 
1994; Radecki and Jaccard 1995); the two constructs influence search and choice behavior 
differently (Radecki and Jaccard 1995; Raju, Lonial, and Mangold 1995); and they often do 
not correspond.2 
General definitions of “political” knowledge share this understanding of knowledge such as 
“factual information about politics and government that individuals retain in their 
memory” (Keeter 2008). Political scientists, while not always explicit, also suggest that 
accuracy and confidence may have different effects on behaviors such as searching and 
processing political information (e.g., Dancey and Sheagley 2013; Koch 2003; Kuklinski et 
al. 2000; Nadeau and Niemi 1995). One such finding is that overconfidence in knowledge 
                                                        
1 Studies on misinformation or misperception are not the exception. Lacking the measure of 
confidence-in-knowledge, they usually do not differentiate the misinformed from the uninformed in 
their empirical definition of misinformedness (e.g., Bode and Vraga 2015; Kuklinski et al. 2000; 
Maurer and Reinemann 2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2010).  
2 The relationship between the two constructs is rather inclusive as correlation coefficients shown 
in previous studies vary widely (Moorman et al. 2004): Some reported the correlation higher than 
0.5 (e.g., 0.54 in Brucks 1985; 0.65 in Park et al. 1994) while others reported very low correlations 
(e.g., 0.08 in Ellen 1994; 0.05 in Radecki and Jaccard 1995). 
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(misinformedness) can be more detrimental than the mere lack of correct information 
without strong belief in it (uninformedness) because the former misleads individuals’ 
preferences and the subsequent political choices and judgments (e.g. Lewandowsky et al. 
2005).3  Other studies show that individuals who are more confident in their knowledge 
are less active in searching for information and more likely to rely on cognitive shortcuts 
(Dancey and Sheagley 2013). Although confidence-in-knowledge is important for 
understanding the consequences of political knowledge, we know very little about it.4 
What is confidence in knowledge and where does it originate? Psychologists find that 
confidence-in-knowledge involves a self-assessed ability to find related or cued facts in 
memory and thus represents the ability to express knowledge stored in memory (e.g., 
Radecki and Jaccard 1995). For example, an individual who is asked to recall some specific 
information but is unable to may still know enough to indicate whether or not s/he would 
be able to recognize it (Schacter 1983, 39). Confidence-in-knowledge taps into this mode of 
expressing knowledge about unrecalled or incorrectly retrieved information that cannot be 
captured by the typical measurement of retrieval accuracy, and thus represents the 
availability, accessibility, or familiarity of information stored in one’s memory. 
                                                        
3 Moreover, misinformation is widespread in politics (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Nyhan 2010), but 
correcting misinformation is hard, especially for politically committed people (Lewandowsky et al. 
2005; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). 
4 We recognize that studies on voters’ perceptions about candidates (or leaders’ perceptions about 
constituents) use the concept of perceptual (un)certainty (e.g., Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Bartels 
1986; Clausen 1977; Clausen, Holmberg, and DeHaven-Smith 1983; Koch 2003; Sanders 2001). On 
the surface, perceptual (un)certainty appears to be relevant to confidence-in-knowledge in the 
present study because both are dealing with uncertainty and the survey questions tapping into the 
concepts are similar (i.e., “how confident/ certain are you...”). However, there are several 
fundamental differences. First, perceptual (un)certainty in previous studies focuses on the 
uncertainty in a subject’s judgmental statement about others, where no definite correct or wrong 
answer exists (but we can only tell with the degree of (in)congruence between, for example, a 
candidate’s observed ideological orientation and voters’ perception about it). Given the fact that the 
perceptual (un)certainty is employed in the context of how voters (or leaders) perceive politicians’ 
(or constituents’) left-right placement, attitudes, and issue positions, using the same terminology 
may cause some confusions. Second, more importantly, the concept of confidence-in-knowledge in 
this study belongs strictly to the dimensions of factual knowledge that, measured by the number of 
correct answers for factual knowledge items, previous studies found as one of the determinants of 
such perceptual (un)certainty (e.g., Glasgow and Alvarez 2000; Koch 2003). This apparently 
suggests that the literature speaks to different matters. 
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If confidence-in-knowledge represents the availability or accessibility of information 
stored in memory, we should observe different behavioral consequences for individuals 
whose stored information is less available from those whose stored information is more 
available. One such manifestation would be response latency. Response latency is a general 
behavioral measure of the amount of cognitive efforts required to process information, and 
its association with information accessibility and attitude accessibility is well established 
(e.g., Bassili 1996; Fazio 1990; Fazio et al. 1982; Higgins and King 1981; Huckfeldt et al. 
1999, 2005; Lavine, Borgida, and Sullivan 2000). The “accessibility” is defined by the ease 
and quickness with which a person can retrieve an attitude or information from memory. If 
a higher level of confidence-in-knowledge indicates a greater accessibility and availability 
of information, the response time for the fact-based questions must be shorter for a person 
who is more confident about the answer than a person less confident.  
This leads to an expectation that the confidence-in-knowledge will be negatively associated 
with response time for answering factual questions (i.e., the higher the confidence, the 
quicker the response). We, however, do not expect that retrieval accuracy is necessarily 
associated with the reaction time. This is because the retrieval accuracy may result from 
processes other than mere access to information. For instance, the same correct response 
to a question may require longer reaction time for good guessers than true sophisticates 
(and even than unsophisticates who accidently pick the correct answer without 
speculation). We test these expectations in the first part of the empirical section by 
examining how each construct is associated with reaction time. A negative association 
between confidence and response time will support that confidence-in-knowledge 
represents the accessibility and familiarity of relevant information stored in one’s memory. 
In summary, echoing the theoretical conceptualization of political knowledge proposed in 
previous studies, we claim that political knowledge should be defined by at least two 
constructs: 1) the availability and accessibility of stored information (captured by 
confidence-in-knowledge) and 2) the accuracy of recalled or retrieved information 
(captured by retrieval accuracy). And whether confidence in knowledge is a good proxy of 
the accessibility and familiarity of information can be empirically assessed by examining its 
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relation with response time: an individual with higher confidence in her or his knowledge 
should respond to factual questions more rapidly than those with lower confidence. 
4. Do Accuracy and Confidence Share the Same Antecedents and Consequences? 
This section elucidates which aspect of political knowledge (accuracy vs. confidence) the 
existing theories about political knowledge are speaking to. Decomposing the concept of 
political knowledge into the two constructs, we revisit explanations in the literature and 
propose hypotheses that identify different relationships of retrieval accuracy and 
confidence-in-knowledge with well-known causes and consequences of political knowledge 
in the literature. 
Antecedents of Political Knowledge: Motivation and Intellectual Capability 
A consistent finding in political behavior research is that people who are more interested in 
politics and more educated are likely to be more knowledgeable about politics. Political 
interest is the core motivation to seek out political information and learn about politics, 
and thus one of the most important antecedents of political knowledge. The key mechanism 
underlying this linkage is that politically interested citizens seek out and consume more 
information, and in this process they “encounter and think more seriously about the 
political information they notice” (Luskin 1990). If a higher level of interest fosters more 
exposure to political information, as told, the immediate consequence will essentially be 
the expansion of available information – an increase in accessibility and familiarity of 
information they have sought out. 
While the process described above suggests that political interest affects the availability of 
information, we do not expect that political interest will necessarily enhance retrieval 
accuracy. Instead, we think there is one more hurdle to achieve accuracy in retrieving 
information – individuals’ cognitive and intellectual ability developed though repeated 
learning processes for encoding and retrieval. The level of formal education, which the 
literature consistently found having a strong association with political knowledge, might be 
a good proxy for this specific ability to accurately retrieve stored information because 
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“[c]ognitive skills are learned in school […] that make subsequent learning about politics 
easier” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 193). 
Putting together, the two most common antecedents of political knowledge in the literature 
– political interest and education – motivate political knowledge differently. Political 
interest is more likely to increase the accessibility and the familiarity of political 
information and will thus have a substantial impact on confidence-in-knowledge than 
retrieval accuracy. In contrast, we expect that levels of educational attainment will have a 
stronger association with retrieval accuracy than confidence-in-knowledge. 
Consequences of Political Knowledge: Political Engagement and Informed Choices 
Political knowledge is known to be associated with a number of important political traits, 
including stability of political attitudes, political trust, support for democratic values, 
political participation, and informed choices (see Galston (2001) for a comprehensive 
review). Among others, our discussion below focuses on political engagement and 
informed vote choice and whether and how the two constructs of political knowledge affect 
them. 
Why does political knowledge promote political engagement? According to Delli Carpini 
and Keeter (1996), knowledge “promotes an understanding of why politics is relevant” 
(224) and “provides the specific facts necessary to make citizens aware of opportunities to 
participate, and of how to participate once aware of these opportunities” (225). The major 
contribution of political knowledge in this process is making individuals recognize the 
importance of politics and participation opportunities. In the fulfillment of this task, greater 
exposure to abundant political information, which would lead to a higher level of 
availability and accessibility of political information, can be more important in enhancing 
the general sense of “civic duty” than retrieval accuracy. The reason is that an individual 
who possesses a wide range of “incorrect” information could also recognize the importance 
of politics and participation opportunities. Therefore, we expect that it is confidence-in-
knowledge than retrieval accuracy that fosters citizen involvement in the democratic 
process. 
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We expect that retrieval accuracy, instead, is more closely associated with the quality of 
opinions and political decisions. In the literature, the core contribution of political 
knowledge to informed political choices is its role in promoting enlightened self-interest 
and making choices based on self-interest. Possessing accurate information is necessary for 
citizens to be able to connect personal or group interests with specific public issues and 
with political agents who can best represent the self-interest.5  Lau and Redlawsk (1997) 
consider the concept of “correct voting” in the continuum of retrieval accuracy, defining it 
as “the choice which would have been made under conditions of full information” (586). 
Our discussion on the core mechanisms through which political knowledge promotes 
political participation and informed political choices leads to expectations that confidence-
in-knowledge is a better predictor of political engagement than retrieval accuracy and that 
retrieval accuracy is more important for citizens’ ability to make better political choices 
than confidence-in-knowledge. 
Decomposing the two aspects of political knowledge, we posit that confidence-in-
knowledge represents the extent to which information stored in one’s memory is 
accessible, available, and familiar. Based on the distinction between retrieval accuracy and 
confidence-in-knowledge, our review of the theories about political knowledge suggests 
that “political knowledge” in these theories sometimes indicates one construct than the 
other. We derive several testable hypotheses to validate which construct of political 
knowledge better corresponds to the mechanisms suggested by the literature. First, with 
regard to the role of political interest and intellectual ability in enhancing political 
knowledge, we expect that political interest is more closely associated with confidence-in-
knowledge than retrieval accuracy (H1), whereas educational attainment is more closely 
associated with retrieval accuracy than confidence (H2). Second, when it comes to the role 
of political knowledge in encouraging political engagement and informed choice, we expect 
                                                        
5 In comparison, “less well-informed citizens canvass fewer relevant considerations, absorb less of 
the ongoing political debate, discern less clearly the differences between the competing candidates, 
and attach less weight to the implications of those differences for their own political values” 
(Bartels 1996, 202). 
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that confidence-in-knowledge is more closely associated with political engagement (H3), 
whereas retrieval accuracy is more closely associated with informed choice (H4). 
5. Data 
Survey Design and Knowledge Questions 
We conducted an online survey in which a total of 792 citizens of the UK participated. The 
survey was fielded in November 2013 using Survey Sampling International’s online 
sample.6 We asked nine factual questions about civic and political knowledge. To reduce 
the bias due to guessing, “Don’t Know” option was not offered (Miller and Orr 2008; 
Mondak 2000, 2001; Mondak and Davis 2001). Instead, we asked respondents to rate their 
confidence in the correctness of their answer to each item (“How confident are you that 
your answer is correct?”) on a scale from 0 to 100.7 
This self-assessed confidence rating is primarily to measure the “confidence-in-knowledge” 
that represents the availability and accessibility of information relevant to the topic of the 
question. The self-assessed rating can also be an auxiliary measure for the degree of 
guessing involved in survey responses when DK is not an option – Respondents will give 
higher confidence ratings on the questions for which they have more available and 
accessible information than on less familiar issues where they have to guess.8 
Retrieval accuracy is measured in the conventional way by looking at whether the answer 
is correct. The nine questions are about “world facts” (Nadeau and Niemi 1995; Strube 
1987), including the current economic situation (unemployment rate), societal change 
                                                        
6 See Online Appendix F for the comparison of sample characteristics between our respondents and 
the British Election Survey. 
7 Respondents made the confidence ratings by moving a slider bar. We set the initial “anchor” value 
at 50 to avoid bias due to the anchoring value (Cervone and Peake 1986; Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). 
8 In addition to this item-level variance within an individual, responses to the self-assessed 
confidence can differ due to individual-level factors. The drivers of inter-personal differences will 
be captured in our statistical model. 
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(immigrant group), government composition, party leaders, and political systems (see 
Appendix). These questions tap into “what people should know about politics” (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1993) and are the kind of non-contentious factual questions typically 
used in electoral and political surveys. 
Descriptive Results 
Respondents correctly answered an average of 5.7 items and the average rating of self-
assessed confidence was 71.5. Figure 2 provides a general picture of knowledge domains 
where respondents easily (or hardly) get the answers correct and where they are over-
confident (or under-confident). For each question, the dark-colored bar indicates the 
percentage of respondents who gave the correct answer, and the light-colored bar indicates 
the mean confidence rating from all respondents. The figure shows that questions about 
the Party of the Prime Minister and the Party of Nick Clegg are the easiest ones (more than 
80 percent of the respondents answered correctly) and the question about the Party of the 
Logo (Conservative Party) is the most difficult one (less than 45 percent answered 
correctly) followed by the question about the Party of Natalie Bennett.9 
Figure 2. Percentage of Correct Responses and Mean Confidence Ratings 
                                                        
9 We code the correctness of each answer with a dichotomous variable. For the rank-order question 
for the sizes of parties, we only consider the rank ordering for the three major parties 
(Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats): We take it as correct when a respondent correctly 
rank orders the three parties’ sizes (seat shares in the House of Common). For the question about 
Parties in Cabinet, we accept it as correct when the respondent selects both parties in the coalition. 
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An interesting finding from this aggregate result is that confidence ratings do not always 
correspond to the level of retrieval accuracy.10 Although respondents are generally more 
confident on easier questions, the mean confidence rating for the most difficult question is 
not particularly low (and even higher than the mean confidence rating across all items). 
  
                                                        
10 This pattern – varying correspondence between confidence and accuracy – is also found in Pasek 
et al. (2015)’s study on the American citizens’ knowledge of the Affordable Care Act. 
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Figure 3. Distributions of Confidence Ratings for Correct and Incorrect Answers 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates this pattern more clearly. For each item, we draw two distributions 
for the confidence ratings (x-axis): One for those who gave the correct answer and the 
other for those who gave the wrong answer. If higher accuracy always leads to higher 
confidence, the distribution of the group that answered correctly will be noticeably 
different from that of the group that answered incorrectly and the distribution for the 
former will peak to the right of the distribution for the latter. This pattern is observed only 
in four (or five) items – Party of Nick Clegg, Parties in Government, Party Logo, and Party of 
Prime Minister (and probably Party of Natalie Bennett). For the rest, the distributions of 
both groups are largely overlapping. This indicates that the relationship between accuracy 
and confidence varies considerably across knowledge domains. 
Alternative Vote Benett's Party Clegg's Party
Largest Immigrant Group Parties in Government Conservative Party's Logo
Prime Minister's Party Seat Share of Parties Unemployment Rate
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100
Confidence
D
e
n
si
ty
Answer: Incorrect Correct
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 15 
The varying patterns of retrieval accuracy and confidence ratings across knowledge 
domains necessitate an estimation strategy that takes into account item-specific 
characteristics. In consideration of such item-specific traits, we build a statistical model to 
obtain measures for two latent traits of individual respondents – the ability to accurately 
retrieve the requested information (latent accuracy) and the availability or accessibility of 
the relevant information stored in the person’s memory (latent confidence). These 
measures for latent traits will eventually be mapped on the conceptually defined two-
dimensional space of political knowledge (Figure 1), and we use them to test our 
hypotheses. Before we estimate the latent traits and test the hypotheses, however, we first 
need to validate whether the confidence-in-knowledge is a good proxy of information 
accessibility. 
Confidence as a Proxy of Information Accessibility 
To assess our expectation that confidence ratings will be negatively associated with 
response time, we run several multivariate models where we regress response time in 
seconds (log-transformed) on the two variables from the survey – the correctness of 
answer and the confidence rating.11 Table 1 reports the results from multivariate OLS 
models that include different combinations of item-specific fixed effects and individual-
specific random effects. The results are consistent across models and in support of our 
expectation: Response time is negatively associated with confidence ratings and positively 
with correctness.12  Regardless of the correctness of their answers, respondents with high 
                                                        
11 Correctness is a dichotomous variable where 1 denotes a correct answer and 0 otherwise. 
Confidence rating originally ranges from 0 to 100, but we recoded it to vary from 0 to 1 to make 
comparisons of estimated effects more intuitive. 
12 Some might raise a concern that online survey takers sometimes “cheat” by looking up other 
Internet pages to answer knowledge questions (e.g., Clifford and Jerit 2016; Jensen and Thomsen 
2014), and thus that the positive relationship between accuracy and response time might be the 
artifact of such behavior. Although our survey unfortunately did not include instructions 
discouraging cheating, we find that our results are not significantly affected by cheating, or that the 
effect of such behavior must be marginal. If many of the respondents cheated, we should observe 
that the reaction time should have the same relationship with the correctness and with the 
reported confidence rating because cheating will result in both correct answers and higher 
confidence in correctness. Moreover, given the finding that looking up the Internet led to shorter 
response time (Jensen and Thomsen 2014), the relationship between accuracy and reaction time 
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confidence require shorter time to answer a factual question than those with low 
confidence. 
Table 1. Response Time Model 
 Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time for Each Item) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Answered correctly 0.234*** 
(0.026) 
0.213*** 
(0.026) 
0.168*** 
(0.026) 
0.082*** 
(0.023) 
0.074** 
(0.023) 
Confidence rating -0.744*** 
(0.045) 
-0.240*** 
(0.047) 
-0.201*** 
(0.047) 
-0.367*** 
(0.045) 
-0.358*** 
(0.045) 
Gender (male)   -0.071** (0.022)  
-0.046 
(0.043) 
Age   0.008 (0.005)  
0.012 
(0.009) 
Age2   0.000 (0.000)  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Education   -0.029** (0.009)  
-0.024 
(0.018) 
Constant 2.413*** 
(0.032) 
2.401*** 
(0.044) 
2.148*** 
(0.114) 
2.574*** 
(0.043) 
2.189*** 
(0.217) 
Fixed Effects (Item) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effects (Individual) No No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.041 0.169 0.196   
Number of observations 6581 6581 6581 6581 6581 
Number of groups    732 732 
Variance (Intercept)    0.297 0.269 
Variance (Residual)    0.487 0.487 
Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the natural-log transformed response 
time. Due to technical issues, response times of sixty respondents are missing. 
6. Measuring Accuracy and Confidence with Latent Scale Modeling 
To test our hypotheses, we need the measures of accuracy and confidence that correspond 
to the conceptual map in Figure 1. There are two possible ways to measure accuracy and 
confidence at the individual level. First, a straightforward way is to use the reported 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
should be negative, not positive as we found, and subsequently the relationship between confidence 
and reaction time should be also negative. This works against our expectation that the relations 
with reaction time will be different for retrieval accuracy and confidence-in-knowledge. 
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measures directly constructed from survey responses, such as the number of correct 
answers (for accuracy) and the average of confidence ratings across items (for confidence). 
Second, a more sophisticated way is to apply methods for scaling latent traits to estimate 
an individual respondent’s latent ability of retrieval accuracy (i.e., latent accuracy) and 
latent accessibility of relevant information (i.e., latent confidence).  
We take the latter approach in this study for two reasons. First, for the number of correct 
answers to represent respondents’ retrieval accuracy, we should assume that all questions 
are equally important to measure the retrieval accuracy. This is obviously not always the 
case. For example, some inherently easy questions do not say much about the respondents’ 
political knowledge while harder questions are likely to better distinguish respondents at 
various levels of informedness. We have shown in Figures 2 and 3, some political 
knowledge questions in our survey better differentiate the respondents than other items. 
This necessitates a methodology that detects characteristics of the items and assigns more 
weights on informative questions than less informative ones. The latent scaling models we 
employ here accomplish this.  
Second, for the purpose of this particular research, it is desirable to estimate the latent 
confidence that is not directly caused by the latent accuracy, so that our respondents can be 
located in the two-dimensional space corresponding to the conceptual map (Figure 1). 
From the reported measures we already know that the correlation between the two 
observed measures is moderate at best (r=0.39). This justifies that our conceptual map is 
more than unidimensional. However, it is also true that in some cases retrieval accuracy 
could enhance reported confidence ratings. Our latent scaling model adjusts the existing 
moderate-to-weak association between the two reported measures so that the resulting 
latent confidence scale captures a single latent trait independent from the latent 
accuracy.13  
                                                        
13 To preview, the correlation between the two resulting latent scales are close to zero (r=0.05), 
while these latent scales hold a strong relationship with their respective reported measures 
(r>0.81). See Online Appendix C for the correlation matrix between the reported and latent 
measures of accuracy and confidence. 
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We propose a method of latent scales by extending an Item Response Theory (IRT) model, 
a widely-used method to estimate latent ability or traits (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1993; Levendusky and Jackman 2003). Our model estimates two latent scales of political 
knowledge – latent accuracy and latent confidence. Using a standard IRT model in which 
outcome variable is the correctness of the answer to each question, we estimate the latent 
accuracy for each respondent as a single measure. Similarly, using the self-reported 
confidence rating for each question as the outcome variable, we estimate the latent 
confidence scale through a method similar to the latent accuracy model. 
Latent Accuracy Model 
In our latent accuracy model, we assume that a latent trait of individual’s accuracy explains 
a binary outcome of whether or not a respondent gives a correct answer for each question. 
A standard IRT model is appropriate to estimate this type of latent traits. In our application, 
we use a two-parameter IRT model (Jackman 2009, 454-458). 
The outcome variable, RST, is a binary variable for the correctness of respondent U’s answer 
to V-th question. The variable takes 1 if the answer is correct, otherwise 0. There is an 
auxiliary random variable, WST , which indicates the value of the binary outcome variable: 
RST = X1 if WST > 00 otherwise 
and, the value of WST  is determined by the following formula: 
WST = ZT[S − ]T + _ST
_ST ∼ a(0,1)     (1) 
where WST  is a linear combination of a parameter at individual respondent level ([S), two 
parameters at item level (ZT  and ]T), and a random error with the standard normal 
distribution (_ST).  The parameter of our main interest is [S, which is an unobservable, 
latent measure of respondent U’s ability to retrieve information accurately. The intercept, 
]T , is an item difficulty parameter of item V: For a difficult question with large ]T , it is less 
likely that WST  takes positive value. The slope, ZT , is an item discrimination parameter: When 
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the value of ZT  is large, a small change in the latent accuracy, [S, can have a large effect on 
the value of WST  at a particular level of [S. 
Latent Confidence Model 
In our survey, each factual knowledge question is followed by a question about the 
respondent’s confidence in the correctness of the answer. In this latent confidence model, 
we assume that there is a general, individual-level latent trait of confidence in political 
knowledge for a respondent U, denoted bS , and that latent confidence is reflected in the 
reported level of confidence rating for each question, cST. The confidence equation has a 
specification similar to WST  in the latent accuracy model (Equation 1), but cST is directly 
measurable from survey questions on a continuous scale (which is inverse-logit 
transformed in actual estimation). The latent confidence model is specified as a linear 
model with a random error term: 
cST = deTbS + dfT[S − gT + hST
hST ∼ a(0, ijf)     (2) 
where two latent measures of political knowledge are simultaneously included. The latent 
accuracy, [S , is included in this equation to capture its effect on the reported confidence 
rating, cST. It is worth highlighting that by including both terms, the estimated confidence 
level bS  becomes the latent confidence level not explained by the retrieval accuracy. This 
separation of bS  from [S assures the independence of latent confidence from latent 
accuracy, allowing us to explore the confidence-in-knowledge as a latent trait after 
accounting for its contribution to retrieval accuracy. 
The resemblance of Equation 2 and 1 allows simple interpretation of item-level parameters 
in Equation 2. Each of the two latent scales at the individual level is multiplied by an item-
specific slope coefficient (deT or dfT). The meanings of these slopes are similar to the 
discrimination parameter ZT  in the latent accuracy model: The larger deT (or dfT) is, the 
larger the effect of the latent confidence (or accuracy, respectively) on the reported 
confidence rating for item V. The intercept gT is analogues to the item difficulty parameter 
in the latent accuracy model: When an item V has a larger gT , it indicates that the item 
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“seems difficult” to a respondent and that respondents tend to report lower confidence 
ratings on average. 
Other Outcome Variables Explained by Latent Scales 
Our hypotheses regarding consequences of political knowledge (H3 and H4) contend that 
retrieval accuracy and confidence-in-knowledge will explain other outcome variables, such 
as political engagement and informed vote choice. To test them, we include both the latent 
accuracy and confidence scales as the predictors of the outcome variables. Since the latent 
scales have no single representative value as they are measured as a distribution, it might 
be an intuitive solution to use summary measures – such as mean of median of 
distributions – to estimate these models. However, this solution ignores the uncertainty 
around the latent scales and the results can be biased (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 
2014; Junker, Schofield, and Taylor 2012). Therefore, we instead incorporate our two 
latent trait models into a unified model and jointly estimate this system of models 
exploiting the flexibility of Bayesian modeling (cf. Fox and Glas 2003). 
Model Identification  
Latent scale models have identification problem because models are identified up to a 
linear transformation even in the one dimensional scaling case (c.f. Fox, 2010, Chapter 4), 
and this issue could be more complicated under the multidimensional latent scaling 
because of the issue of rotation. Rivers (2003) discusses the case of multidimensional 
latent models for the IRT modeling, with particular focus on the ideological point 
estimation using the roll-call votes as the input of the model. Despite some similarities 
between our identification problem and that of higher dimensional ideal point estimation, 
they are essentially different.  Our model has two measured outcomes as notated in 
Equations 1 and 2, instead of one in multidimensional ideal point estimation (e.g., roll-call 
votes), and therefore the rotation of two latent scales is not a concern. There are two 
identification strategies to obtain well-defined posterior distributions: one by 
normalization (global identification) and another by fixing the variance (local 
identification). We estimated our models with both strategies and the key results were 
essentially the same. In Section 7, we present our results by using the local identification 
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strategy with an informed prior (the standard normal distributions) on the distributions of 
the two latent scales (c.f. Jackman, 2009) as the interpretation of these results are more 
intuitive.14 
We estimate the model through Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation 
implemented in JAGS 4.1.0, setting a diffuse prior for parameters except for the two latent 
scales. We run 20,000 iterations for two chains with thinning of 10 after 5,000 burn-in. The 
MCMC diagnostics show no sign of non-convergence. More detailed model descriptions, 
JAGS code, and MCMC diagnostics are available in Online Appendix. 
Estimates from Latent Scale Models  
Item Level Parameters 
Figure 4 shows the posterior density plots of difficulty and discrimination parameters from 
the latent accuracy model. The sizes of parameters vary across knowledge items. For 
example, the difficulty parameter for the Party Logo question is particularly large and the 
discrimination parameter is also moderately large. These parameter estimates indicate that 
the Party Logo item is an example of a “difficult” question that distinguishes respondents 
with high and low retrieval accuracy, i.e., most respondents give the wrong answer for this 
question but respondents with high levels of accuracy are very likely to answer correctly. 
  
                                                        
14 Online Appendix A provides an extensive discussion on the identification of our model as well as 
the descriptions and results of globally identified models.  
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Figure 4. Difficulty and Discrimination Parameter Estimates from Latent Accuracy Model 
 
 
Four items – Parties in Cabinet, Size of Parties, Alternative Vote, and Immigrants – have 
similar difficulty parameters, but their discrimination parameters are quite different. The 
discrimination parameter for the Parties in Cabinet is the largest, indicating that this item 
is most strongly represented by the latent accuracy, [; the discrimination parameter for 
Immigrants is the smallest, indicating that the likelihood of correctly answering this 
question is not particularly high even for the respondents with a high level of accuracy than 
those with a lower level of accuracy. 
Next, Figure 5 plots the parameters from the latent confidence model. The horizontal axis 
indicates the estimates of intercept parameter, g, and the vertical axis indicates the 
estimates of the slope coefficients, de, for the latent confidence. The two estimates draw a 
linear relationship: When the intercept parameters are large, the slopes are large as well. 
The order in the sizes of the intercept parameters is similar to the (reverse) order in the 
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reported average confidence rating for each item (see Figure 2). For example, the PM’s 
Party question has the smallest intercept. In the latent accuracy model, this item is one of 
the least difficult items. Similarly, in the latent confidence model, this is one of the items to 
which respondents are very likely to report that they are confident of their answer 
regardless of the level of their latent confidence. In contrast, the Bennett’s Party question 
better distinguishes respondents with a low level of latent confidence from those with a 
high level of confidence, i.e., although the average confidence rating for this item is lower 
than other items, respondents with a higher level of latent confidence tend to report higher 
confidence ratings in survey. To summarize, our results for the parameter estimates 
indicate that each item contributes differentially to our understanding of respondents’ 
latent traits regarding retrieval accuracy and confidence in knowledge. This justifies the 
use of latent scale modeling.  
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Figure 5. Intercept and Slope Parameter Estimates from Latent Confidence Model 
 
Individual Level Parameters 
The parameters of our main interests are the latent accuracy [S and the latent confidence bS  
of each individual respondent. Figure 6 maps individual respondents in two dimensional 
political knowledge spaces using the median [S  against the median bS  from MCMC samples. 
Each point indicates each respondent’s median level of the two latent traits. The plot 
exhibits little correlation between latent accuracy and latent confidence (r2 = 0.05)  as we 
have specified the latent confidence model in a way that an individual’s latent confidence 
and latent accuracy can independently influence the reported confidence ratings for each 
item (Equation 2). 
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Figure 6. Mapping Respondents on the Two Conceptual Dimensions 
 
7. Testing Hypotheses 
We test our four hypotheses using parameter estimates from the MCMC simulations. We 
first explore how political interest and education are differently associated with the levels 
of retrieval accuracy and confidence (H1 and H2). We then show the differential effects of 
retrieval accuracy and confidence in knowledge on political engagement and informed vote 
choice (H3 and H4).15 When interpreting the results, it is important to acknowledge that 
our two latent scales have the same distribution with zero mean and the variance of one, 
which makes the effects of the two latent scales directly comparable. 
                                                        
15 By referring to antecedents and consequences of political knowledge, we do not claim strict 
causal relationship between the variables. We acknowledge that we cannot exclude the possibility 
of the reciprocal or reverse causal relations (e.g., political interest and political knowledge may 
reinforce each other). Our intention to use these terms is to indicate “typical” models that treat 
political knowledge as an explanatory or outcome variable in various political behavior studies. 
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Political Knowledge as Outcome Variable 
Based on the theories about antecedents of political knowledge, we expect that political 
interest is a more important determinant for confidence-in-knowledge than for retrieval 
accuracy while educational attainment is more important for retrieval accuracy. 
We estimate two linear models in which each latent scale is a dependent variable. The 
variables of interest are political interest and educational attainment.16 The model includes 
party identification, gender and age as control variables that are commonly used to predict 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Dolan 2011; Dow 2009; Jerit, Barabas, 
and Bolsen 2006). To incorporate the uncertainty in the latent scale estimates, we employ a 
strategy advocated by Armstrong II et al. (2014, 282–6), in which a model is estimated 
repeatedly for each value of MCMC samples, and the distribution of point estimates of each 
parameter is used to calculate a confidence interval. 
Figure 7 presents the standardized coefficients of political interest and education from the 
accuracy and confidence models with the bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals. The 
results support our expectations. Both political interest and education have positive effects 
on latent accuracy, but only political interest has a positive effect on latent confidence. As 
expected, the results show that political interest has a stronger association with latent 
confidence than with latent accuracy (H1), and that higher educational attainment 
enhances retrieval accuracy, but has no such association with confidence (H2). 
  
                                                        
16 Education is measured on a five-point scale, from no qualifications to postgraduate degree, and 
political interest on a four-point scale from not at all interested to very interested. Party identifier is 
a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent identified herself with a party. 
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Figure 7. The Effects of Political Interest and Education on Two Latent Traits 
 
Note: The point indicates the mean of coefficients estimates. Solid lines indicate the Bayesian 
credible intervals corresponding to 95 percent credible intervals. All variables are standardized.  
 
Political Knowledge as Explanatory Variable 
We now test the last two hypotheses. We estimate models where the two latent scales and 
the interaction between the two are the predictors of political engagement and informed 
political choice. We expect that latent confidence will be the key construct to encourage 
political engagement (H3), whereas latent accuracy will be more important to foster 
informed choices (H4). 
In our model of political engagement, we use the frequency of political discussion as the 
dependent variable.17  The equation for political discussion is specified simply as a linear 
model with a normally distributed error term: 
                                                        
17 Self-reported turnout or intention to vote is one of the most common types of political 
engagement that political knowledge predicts. In our survey, there is one question relevant to 
electoral participation, but not in a desirable format. The option “not to vote” is included as a choice 
option in a typical vote intention question along with a list of party names. As the result, the 
percentage of abstention was unrealistically low (9%). Due to this problem, we use political 
discussion (i.e., “when you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters frequently, occasionally, rarely, or never?”) – a form of political engagement (Solt 2008; 
Van Deth and Elff 2004; e.g., Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997) – as the dependent variable. 
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PoldiscS|[S, bS , mS, nopqrstu, vopqrstu ∼ a(nopqrstu,e[S + nopqrstu,fbS +  nopqrstu,w[S ∗ bS +
mSvopqrstu, iopqrstu),       (3) 
where [S and bS  denote the two latent variables, and mS is a vector of control variables that 
may also influence political discussion. The control variables include age, age2, gender, 
education, political interest, and whether a respondent is a party identifier. For 
comparison, we also report the results from an OLS regression that uses the number of 
correct answers for accuracy instead of the latent scale. 
Table 2. Consequences of Political Knowledge: Political Engagement 
 Dependent Variable: Political Discussion 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Number of Correct Answer 
 
0.070 
(0.012, 0.127) 
0.033 
(-0.017, 0.083)   
Latent Accuracy 
   
0.076 
(0.010, 0.145) 
0.022 
(-0.036, 0.079) 
Latent Confidence 
   
0.202 
(0.139, 0.265) 
0.083 
(0.026, 0.140) 
Latent Accuracy x  
          Latent Confidence   
0.006 
(-0.072, 0.080) 
0.033 
(-0.033, 0.101) 
Political Interest 
  
0.498 
(0.437, 0.559)  
0.472 
(0.408, 0.540) 
Gender (Male) 
 
0.046 
(-0.067, 0.158) 
-0.075 
(-0.173, 0.024) 
-0.015 
(-0.130, 0.095) 
-0.090 
(-0.189, 0.011) 
Education 
 
0.059 
(0.012, 0.106) 
0.034 
(-0.007, 0.074) 
0.055 
(0.009, 0.100) 
0.036 
(-0.006, 0.077) 
Party identifier 
 
0.504 
(0.328, 0.679) 
0.103 
(-0.057, 0.263) 
0.403 
(0.225, 0.573) 
0.091 
(-0.069, 0.249) 
Age 
 
-0.753 
(-3.149, 1.644) 
0.623 
(-1.464, 2.711) 
-0.979 
(-3.052, 1.363) 
0.442 
(-1.649, 2.589) 
Age2 
 
0.159 
(-2.453, 2.772) 
-0.857 
(-3.129, 1.415) 
0.584 
(-1.933, 2.839) 
-0.577 
(-2.923, 1.739) 
Constant 
 
2.486 
(1.904, 3.068) 
1.015 
(0.478, 1.551) 
2.635 
(2.073, 3.164) 
1.135 
(0.525, 1.665) 
Observations 
R2 
790 
0.071 
790 
0.300 
790 
 
790 
 
Models 1 and 2: Results from OLS regressions using the conventional measure for comparison. 
Models 3 and 4: Results from the joint scaling models. Models 2 and 4 include political interest as a 
control variable. The upper and lower bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals (Models 1 and 2) 
and credible intervals (Models 3 and 4) are in parentheses. 
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Table 2 reports the results from four models: The first two include the number of correct 
answer to measure retrieval accuracy, with and without political interest as a control 
variable; and the last two include the latent scales for retrieval accuracy and confidence-in-
knowledge and an interaction between the two, with and without political interest. In 
Models 1 and 3 that do not include political interest, political knowledge has a significant 
positive effect on political discussion, regardless of the type of measurements used. 
However, the sizes of the effects are different: Individuals with a higher level of confidence-
in-knowledge are more likely to be active in political discussion than those with the same 
level of retrieval accuracy.  
Political interest, once included in the model, becomes the foremost important variable to 
explain political discussion, which is not surprising given our theoretical justification 
earlier. In Models 2 and 4, all of the political knowledge measurements are positively 
associated with political discussion. However, the effect of retrieval accuracy, regardless of 
the type of measures, becomes indistinguishable from zero effect, whereas the effect of 
latent confidence is still remained significant and positively associated with political 
discussion as we expected (H3). Lastly, we do not find a meaningful interaction effect 
between the two latent traits on political discussion (Models 3 and 4). All together, the 
results suggest that it is the availability and familiarity with political information than 
retrieval accuracy that matter more for individuals to actively participate in political 
discussion. 
Based on Model 3, we calculate the predicted level of political discussion. In Figure 8, the 
three panels demonstrate the substantive effects of latent traits. The x-axis is an 
individual’s latent accuracy or confidence level based on the percentile from the sample, 
and the y-axis is the predicted value for political discussion. The first panel demonstrates 
that an increase in the level of latent accuracy does not make a meaningful difference in the 
level of political discussion. However, the middle panel shows that as an individual 
becomes more active in political discussion when the level of latent confident increases 
(from 20 to 80 percentile).  
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In the last panel, we draw two prediction lines separately for those at low and high levels of 
latent confidence while varying the level of latent accuracy on the x-axis. The figure clearly 
demonstrates that the level of engagement in political discussion is significantly higher 
when a person has a higher level of confidence (the upper line) compared to the same 
person with a lower level of confidence (the bottom line). The results consistently indicate 
that it is the latent confidence (than latent accuracy) that makes a significant behavioral 
difference in political discussion. Echoing this, the figure also demonstrates that those with 
low retrieval accuracy and high confidence (Misinformed) are significantly more active in 
political discussions than those with high retrieval accuracy and low confidence (Partially 
Informed). Overall, the results support our claim that political engagement is more closely 
associated with confidence-in-knowledge than with retrieval accuracy. 
Figure 8. The Effects of Latent Accuracy and Latent Confidence on Political Discussion 
 
Note: The x-axis is an individual’s latent accuracy or confidence level based on the percentile from 
the sample, and the y-axis is the predicted value for political discussion. The values of input are 
presented as the percentile of accuracy (the left-most and the right-most panels) or confidence 
(center) from the MCMC samples, with fixed values for control variables at their mean or median. 
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Lastly, we examine the impact of the two constructs on informed political choice (H4) 
employing the concept of “correct voting” proposed by Lau and Redlawsk (1997). Among 
various ways to operationalize the concept, we utilize the one related to the “prospective 
policy-based considerations” used in Lau et al. (2014) to measure whether a respondent 
makes a decision by voting for a party whose position is the most approximate to the 
person’s position in the left-right ideological spectrum. The proximity is calculated from 
ideological self-placement in our survey and “true” ideological positions of parties based on 
expert judgments in 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2012). We construct a 
binary measure that indicates whether or not a respondent is willing to vote for a party 
that is ideologically closest to her. We estimate a probit model that includes a set of control 
variables and is specified as: 
Pr(InformedS = 1|[S , bS , mS , nyz{p|}~r, vyz{p|}~r) =
Φnyz{p|}~r,e[S + nyz{p|}~r,fbS +  nInformed,3[U ∗ bU + mSvyz{p|}~r.           (4) 
In Table 3, we report the results using the latent scales in Model 2 and the results using the 
number of correct answers in Model 1 for comparison. As hypothesized, the latent accuracy 
significantly increases the chance to support the ideologically closest party while the effect 
of the latent confidence is in the opposite direction in Model 2. Interestingly, this positive 
effect of accuracy on correct voting is more pronounced when coupled with a high level of 
confidence, as the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is positive.  
Table 3. Consequences of Political Knowledge: Voting Correctly 
 Dependent Variable: Voting for a party that is ideologically closest to the respondent 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Number of Correct Answer 
 
0.187 
(0.085, 0.289)  
Latent Accuracy 
  
0.221 
(0.091, 0.357) 
Latent Confidence 
  
-0.141 
(-0.268, -0.016) 
Latent Accuracy x Latent Confidence 
  
0.223 
(0.075, 0.382) 
Gender (Male) 
 
0.007 
(-0.188, 0.201) 
0.015 
(-0.187, 0.221) 
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Education 
 
0.090 
(0.007, 0.174) 
0.097 
(0.016, 0.182) 
Party Identifier 
 
0.710 
(0.349, 1.072) 
0.805 
(0.436, 1.198) 
Age 
 
3.082 
(-1.165, 7.329) 
2.931 
(-0.941, 6.793) 
Age2 
 
-2.251 
(-6.827, 2,326) 
-2.183 
(-6.399, 1.914) 
Constant 
 
-2.332 
(-3.402, -1.262) 
-2.401 
(-3.474, -1.374) 
Observations 
AIC 
790 
965.370 
790 
 
Model 1: Probit model (MLE), Model 2: Results from the joint model. The upper and lower bounds 
of 95 percent confidence intervals (Model 1) and credible intervals (Model 2) are in parentheses. 
 
We show this conditional effect in Figure 9, where we show the substantive effect of the 
latent accuracy on correct voting with 95 percent credible intervals – i.e., the difference in 
the probability of correct voting when latent accuracy changes from low (20 percentile) to 
high (80 percentile). The substantive effect of latent accuracy for those with high level of 
latent confidence is on the top and that for those with low level of latent confidence is on 
the bottom. The results on the top indicate that the latent accuracy tends to significantly 
increase the probability of correct voting (by 0.25 on average) for those with high 
confidence (e.g., when an individual becomes fully-informed from being misinformed). 
However, this is not the case for those whose confidence is at the low level, indicating that 
the probability of correct voting is not so different between the uninformed and the 
partially informed.  
 
Figure 9. Substantive Effects of Latent Accuracy on Correct Voting, Conditional on the Level 
of Latent Confidence  
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8. Conclusion and Discussion 
Decades of political science research highlighted the importance of political knowledge in 
fostering the competency of democratic citizens and the quality of democracy. How to 
conceptualize, operationalize, and measure political knowledge has long been central 
concerns for researchers because political knowledge – by definition, the range of factual 
political information stored in memory – is a concept that cannot be easily observed. 
Extensive efforts have made to devise measurement techniques to get close to the “true” 
level of political knowledge, with the established practice that asks questions about 
political facts essential to exercise democratic citizenship and counts the degree of 
accuracy in the reported responses. 
Although the conventional measure certainly taps into an important aspect of political 
knowledge, it has limitations in accounting for human errors in the retrieval process. 
Confidence-in-knowledge, along with retrieval accuracy, is necessary to define different 
types of political informedness that cannot be captured by the conventional measure. We 
know very little about why some people are more confident in their factual knowledge than 
others, where the confidence comes from, and whether it is important to understand 
political knowledge. 
This study is an initial effort to understand this under-appreciated aspect. Drawing on the 
relevant literature in cognitive psychology and consumer behavior, we argue that 
confidence-in-knowledge is a way of expressing one’s knowledge, which may or may not be 
retrieved accurately, and that it represents the accessibility and availability of relevant 
information. In our original survey, we ask a set of factual questions about politics followed 






Low Confidence (20%)
High Confidence (80%)
−0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Substantive Effect of Latent Accuracy
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by questions about self-assessed confidence in the correctness of their answers. Our 
empirical analysis found that people who respond more rapidly to a factual question 
indicated a higher level of confidence in their responses. This resonates the finding from 
the literature that a short response time indicates the ease and readiness in conducting a 
given cognitive task and supports our claim that a greater accessibility and familiarity of 
information would be associated with confidence-in-knowledge. 
Based on the distinction of the two aspects of political knowledge, we reassess the key 
mechanisms embedded in the theories about political knowledge. In our revisit to the 
theories, we articulate which aspect (accuracy vs. confidence) the theory refers to with 
“political knowledge”, and propose testable hypotheses that retrieval accuracy and 
confidence-in-knowledge are determined by different foundations and have distinctive 
effects on various forms of political behavior. In testing our claims, we presented a method, 
as an extension of IRT models, to measure the respondents’ latent ability to accurately 
retrieve stored information (latent accuracy) and latent accessibility and familiarity of 
political information (latent confidence).  
Utilizing the resulting two latent scales for accuracy and confidence, our empirical analyses 
reveal that each trait has a unique origin and consequences. A key foundation of 
confidence-in-knowledge is political interest, whereas that of retrieval accuracy is 
educational attainment, a proxy of intellectual ability and learning experience. We also find 
that confidence-in-knowledge is more closely associated with political engagement while 
retrieval accuracy is more closely associated with informed vote choice. Our findings imply 
that individuals who are more confident in their political knowledge engage in political 
discussions more frequently, but this active involvement may not result in political choices 
that are consistent with their preferences or interests unless their high confidence is 
coupled with high accuracy.  
This study is also suggestive of future research on predicting political behavior. For 
instance, without measuring confidence-in-knowledge it would be impossible to find that 
misinformed citizens participate as actively as well-informed citizens, and that the 
uninformed and the misinformed are much different in terms of political engagement. The 
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conceptual and empirical work in this study leads to the conclusion that measuring 
confidence-in-knowledge is not only a useful instrument to validate biases and 
measurement issues in the conventional measurement, but also improves our 
understanding of political knowledge. 
 
  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 36 
Appendix. Political Knowledge Questions 
 
* Choice options in all questions except #2 are shown in randomized order. Respondents are not 
allowed to skip questions.  
 
1. Which group of foreign-born residents in the UK had the largest increase in population over the 
last decade? 
(1) Polish-born 
(2) Chinese-born 
(3) Indian-born 
(4) Nigerian-born 
 
2. In what level is the current unemployment rate in the UK? 
(1) Lower than 7.0% 
(2) 7.0-8.5% 
(3) 8.6-10.0% 
(4) 10.1% or higher 
 
3. Which party do you think this logo presents? 
 (1) Conservative 
(2) Labour 
(3) Liberal Democrat 
(4) Scottish National Party 
(5) Plaid Cymru 
(6) Green Party 
 
4. Which one of the following best describes the Alternative Voting (a.k.a. preferential voting) 
system? 
(1) Each voter has the chance to rank the candidates in order of preference. 
(2) Each voter votes for parties instead of for individual candidates. 
(3) Each voter has as many votes as there are choices, and can distribute those votes as 
desired. 
 
5. Please choose the party or parties from the list below that are currently in the Cabinet. You may 
mark one or more parties. 
(1) Conservative 
(2) Labour 
(3) Liberal Democrat 
(4) Scottish National Party 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 37 
(5) Plaid Cymru 
(6) Green Party 
 
6. From which of the following parties does the current Prime Minister come? 
(1) Conservative 
(2) Labour 
(3) Liberal Democrat 
(4) Scottish National Party 
(5) Plaid Cymru 
(6) Green Party 
 
7. Identify the political party affiliation of Nick Clegg? 
(1) Conservative 
(2) Labour 
(3) Liberal Democrat 
(4) Scottish National Party 
(5) Plaid Cymru 
(6) Green Party 
 
8. Identify the political party affiliation of Natalie Bennett? 
(1) Conservative 
(2) Labour 
(3) Liberal Democrat 
(4) Scottish National Party 
(5) Plaid Cymru 
(6) Green Party 
 
9. There are five parties below. Please rank-order the parties from the one that currently has the 
most seats to the least seats in the House of Commons. 
(1) Conservative 
(2) Labour 
(3) Liberal Democrat 
(4) Democratic Unionist Party 
(5) Scottish National Party 
 
* Each question is followed by the confidence rating question below. A pair of factual and 
confidence rating questions are shown on the same page.  
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
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